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Divorce
Under the
New Code
By DAN HOPSON, JR.
PROFESSOR HOPSON explores the various
new alimony decrees made possible by the
new Code of Civil Procedure.
An attorney with an extensive domestic
relations practice should rather quickly
find that the new divorce code' has not
revolutionized his practice. In the bulk
of his cases, he will proceed, with a few
quickly learned changes, as he always
has and will probably obtain about the
same kind of justice that he obtained in
the past. Except in a couple of areas, to
be discussed below, the new code makes
no radical changes.
Yet a sufficient number of modifica-
tions do exist in the new code to require
an attorney to look again at the statute
book before he tries even a default di-
vorce case. Most of the modifications are
obvious and only need reading; a few re-
quire some cross reference work; while
others must await an authoritative pro-
nouncement from the Supreme Court.
In this short article no attempt will be
made to give even a cursory review of all
of the new provisions.2 Only some of the
more important or intriguing will be
pointed up.
GROUNDS
The .legislature removed four of the
old grounds for divorce and turned them
into grounds for annulment,3 but did not
fouch the popular grounds of cruelty and
1 Kan. Code Civ. Pro. 60-1601 to 1611.
2 This has been done elsewhere, see Hopson,
Divorce and Alimony Under the New Code, 12
Kan. L. Rev. 27 (1963) [hereinafter cited as
Hopson, Divorce].
3 Kan. C.S. 1961 Supp., 60-1501 included
bigamy, impotency, fraudulent contract and
pregnancy by another. Slightly modified, they
now appear in Kan. Code Civ. Pro., 60-1602.
See Hopson, Divorce, supra note 2, at 29.
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gross neglect. The legislature did make,
however, both annulment and separate
maintenance much more useful and
attractive remedies.
A suit for separate maintenance, which
now can be brought by either the wife or
the husband, gives the client. all the
economic benefits of a divorce4 and can
be brought by a non-resident5 who does
not have to wait the 60 davs for his
hearing."
Separate maintenance, as a remedy,
has one major limitation. The marriage
relation still continues. If the client
wants it ended, he should consider the
advantages of annulment as a remedy.
There are many advantages; all the same
orders as to alimony and property as
occur in divorce case may be decreed; 7
the client need not be domiciled in
Kansas; 8 he need not wait the 60 days for
his decree;9 and no corroboration is need-
4 See circa note 38, infra.
'Kan. Code Civ. Pro., 60-1603 only requires
domicile for those filing a divorce petition.
I Kan. Code Civ. Pro., 6CI-1608 apparently is
limited to divorce actions.
Kan. Code Civ. Pro., 60-1610.
Kan. Code Civ. Pro., 60-1603.
Kan. Code Civ.. Pro., 60-1608.
ed as to the grounds.'0
The annulment route has been seldom
used in Kansas. This lack of use is prob-
ably due to the fact that both the
"grounds" for annulment and the right to
a division of property were rather
vague." The new code spells out the
grounds,'12 and by including fraudulent
contract as one of them, an attorney
should not have much of a problem, in an
easy marriage dissolution state like
Kansas, in finding sufficient facts. New
York has found at least 150 types of fraud
that will dissolve a marriage.'3 Surely
the Kansas Supreme Court will be as
liberal.
PROCEDURE
As did the old code, the new code pro-
scribed many of its own procedural and
evidence rules. 14 But these rules are not
exhaustive and the major changes in the
rest of the new code will also effect the
trial of a divorce case. For instance, the
new sections on depositions and dis-
covery 5 and on written interrogatories16
should certainly make it easier to dis-
cover the property of the spouses. Allow-
ing the court to order physical and
mental examinations of a party by a
physician17 might make the existence of
mental illness which can be used in a
divorce case both offensively and de-
fensively18 considerably easier to prove.
'0 Kan. Code Civ. Pro., 60-1608(d).
"See Hopson, Divorce, supra note 2, at 29.
"Kan. Code Civ. Pro., 60-1602.
" See Wells, New York: The Poor Mans
Reno, 35 Coinell L. Q. 303, 319 (1950).
14 See e.g. Kan. Code Civ. Pro., 60-1603 to
1605; 60-1607 to 1609.
"Kan. Code Civ. Pro., 60-226 et seq.
18 Kan. Code Civ. Pro., 60-233.
n See Kan. Code Civ. Pro., 60-235.
's See Katz v. Katz, 191 Kan. 500, 382 P.2d
331 (1963); Carter v. Carter, 191 Kan. 80, 379
P.2d 311 (1963); Hammack v. Hammack, 189
Kan. 509, 370 P.2d 93 (1962); Crosby v.
Crosby, 186 Kan. 420, 350 P.2d 796 (1960).
For a discussion of these cases, see Brand and
Hopson, Family Law, 1961-1963 Survey of
Kan. Law., 12 Kan. L. Rev. 257, 263-267
(1963).
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It surely should help in proving a
parent's fitness in a custody fight.19
A couple of changes within the divorce
code itself bear watching. In the section
covering answers and cross-petitions 2'
the legislature provided that a defendant
might file a cross-petition for divorce,
separate maintenance or annulment, even
if he is a non-resident. But the plaintiff
must be domiciled in Kansas. Apparently
the old practice was the same, although
the old code was silent.
This provision has caused one prob-
lem. Since it limits the filing of a cross-
petition to the situation where the plain-
tiff is domiciled in Kansas, 21 and since
those in the Armed Services stationed in
Kansas for one year may obtain a divorce
without being domiciled in Kansas by
using the Armed Service provision,22 the
domicile requirement has excluded non-
resident wives of service personnel. An
attorney representing a service wife may
find himself unable to cross-petition.23
A couple of provisions in the new sec-
tion on interlocutory orders' 4 are note-
worthy. The section specifically provides
for a restraining order on molesting,
something the old code did not do.25 It
also provides for temporary alimony,
child support, and suit money (including
attorney's fees) to be ordered paid by
either party. Thus a wife can now be.
ordered to pay both child support and
temporary alimony to a husband and to
9 Cf. Stafford v. Good, - Kan.
392 P.2d 140 (1964).
20 Kan. Code Civ. Pro., 60-1605.
21 Section 60-1605 reads in part: ' . . . if the
plaintiff qualifies under subsection (a) of
section 60-1603. Section 60-1603 (a) requires
domicile.
2"Kan. Code Civ. Pro., 60-1603(b). See
Craig v. Craig, 143 Kan. 624, 56 P.2d 464
(1936) which so interpreted almost identical
language in the old code.
2"Attorneys have reported that they have
run into this problem. At least one District
Court Judge has ruled that the service wife
may not cross petition unless she has an in-
dependent Kansas domicile.
21 Kan. Code Civ. Pro., 60-1607.
21 Kan. G.S. 1949, 60-1507.
pay the cost of his attorney."6 It has been
the practice of many trial courts to issue
ex parte temporary orders. Since the new
codes make such orders less automatic,
some trial courts may change this prac-
tice.
ALIMONY AND DIVISION OF PROPERTY
The most revolutionary change in the
new code centers on the complete revi-
sion of the power of the trial court to
award alimony and to divide the prop-
erty of the spouses. The court's power
is now spelled out in detail. This power
changes with the type of decree entered.
Perhaps the clearest way to approach
these problems in the new code is to look
at each decree and point up the court's
power and how it contrasts with the old
practice.
1). When the court enters a decree
granting a divorce based on the fault
of either of the spouses:
A) The court must divide the property
of the parties.27 The key change here is
that the wife no longer gets her separate
property set aside to her. All property,
no matter what the state of the title or its
source, is put into a common pot .nd
.divided by the court "in a just and rea-
sonable manner." "Jointly acquired"
property 28 is no longer a meaningful con-
cept in Kansas divorce law.
This change is certainly revolutionary.
A woman, married 40 years ago, now
finds that the property she owned prior
to her marriage can be given to her
-husband no matter who gets the divorce
or annulment, a situation that did not
exist at the time of her marriage. Yet this
is true for a husband who finds the ali-
mony statute changed after his marriage.S Irely a spouse has no right at the time.
"Note also that in Kan. Code Civ. Pro.
60-1610 allows the court to give a final order
for attorney's fees against either spouse and
such an order is not dependent on who wins
the divorce case.
" Kan. Code Civ. Pro., 60-1610(b).
28 See e.g. Kelso v. Kelso, 182 Kan. 665, 324
P.2d. 165 (1958).
FALL 1964
of marriage to the use of a particular set
of alimony' and division of property
statutes.
B) The court may, not must, 29 award
something called maintenance, but still
to be denominated as alimony.30 This
"maintenance" or "alimony," however,
is a far cry from the alimony concept
under the old code.3' The old code
allowed the court to divide the husband's
property by decreeing lump sum alimony
to the wife. The concept of alimony
under the old code was an admixture
of a concept of division of property and
of support.32 The new code tries to turn
alimony into purely a support concept.
For instance, the court is given discretion
to decline to award alimony if there is
no need or if there is no ability to pay.
The court is no longer limited to award-
ing it to the innocent wife. Fault is irrele-
vant. A husband can be the recipient.
More importantly, the court may provide
for variable alimony and may later
modify it. The legislature did all it could
to suggest that alimony was to be de-
creed only when a monthly cash pay-
ment was appropriate.
Three or four problems result, how-
ever, from the wording of the mainte-
nance section. The legislature, in wishing
to give the trial court as broad as possible
discretion in setting the terms and con-
ditions of the alimony award, left in the
phrase "lump sum." Thus a court may
still award a wife $10,000 to be paid im-
mediately or in installments. Since the
trial judges are used to making such
awards, attorneys will, unfortunately,
probably continue to see them.
Such an award has several bad aspects.
First it tends to perpetuate the use of
"alimony" as an equalizer in the division
21 See Kan. C.S. 1949, 60-1511 as interpreted
in Carver v. Carver, 182 Kan. 145, 334 P.2d 408
(1959).
'0 Kan. Code Civ. Pro., 60-1610(c).
" Kan. C.S. 1949, 60-1511.
" See Hopson, Property Rights in Divorce
and Separate Maintenance Cases, 30 Kan. B.J.
302 (1962).
of property. It should and need not be
so used. The court may make cash
awards in the division of property. 3" This
cash award, which allows a fair division
of the present assets of the spouses,
should not be labeled alimony. Alimony
is to come out of future income and, as
stated above, should be based on need,
not the present wealth of the parties. But
the old practice will probably die hard.
Second, a lump sum award is presumably
non-modifiable. Bourman v. Bourman,"4
which allowed a second husband to
collect from a first husband alimony
installments not yet due, has not been
completely laid to rest. Third, a lump
sum award, unless payable over a ten-
year period, Will not give the spouses the
federal income tax benefit of making the
wife treat alimony as income as will the
ncw variable alimony decree.a5
There are also several problems that
the attorney and judge must watch in
awarding variable alimony. One such
problem concerns the conditions imposed
in the original decree. The court is free
to use any type of condition and typical
will be a decree awarding so much
alimony until the death or remarriage of
the wife. But it can be conditioned on
other factors. For instance, under the old
statute judges frequently tried to guess
how much money it would take to let a
wife finish college or secretarial school.
Now the judge may make his decree
read that the wife will receive $150 a
month so long as she is in school and
progressing towards graduation. Other,
even more exotic, conditions are possible.
For example, the court may order sup-
port so long as the husband's net income
is above a certain figure or on a straight
percentage of the husband's income. The
court could even put it on a shifting per-
(Continued on page 214)
1 Kan. Code Civ. Pro., 60-1610(b).
"155 Kan. 602, 127 P.2d 464 (1942).
5 See Hopson, Property Rights, supra note
32, 312. A separate article on the income tax
problems of family dissolution will appear in a
later issue of the Journal.
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Divorce
Continued from page 168.
centage, e.g., 157 for the first year,
10% thereafter, but if the wife decides
to go back to school, then 15% once
again.
Judicial imagination in setting the
conditions in the original decree is im-
portant because of the unique limitation
on the courts' power to modify the award
later. Kan. Code Civ. Pro., 60-1610(e)
reads in part "The court may modify the
amounts or other conditions. 3., but no
modifications shallbe made .-. if it has
the effect of increasing or accelerating
the liability for unpaid alimony beyond
what was prescribed in the original
decree."
This prohibition on upward revision
will force the court into either of two
devices. The court may award a higher
amount than it thinks necessary on the
correct assumption that if it proves too
much the court may reduce the amount,
but if it is too little the court may not in-
crease it or the court may try to control
the situation through imaginative condi-
tions. Apparently the court could, in the
original decree, order $150 a month so
long as the husband's income was below
$10,000, but if it went above $10,000 the
alimony payment would be $200. Al-
though this type of decree will possibly
increase -the husband's liability, this
liability is spelled out in the original de-
cree and that is all the statute requires.
The apparent thrust of the limitation is
to allow a husband to know the outside
limit of his future liability. He need not
know the exact future amount. The var-
ious decrees, set out above, should all
satisfy the statutory limitation.
2) When the court enters a decree
granting an annulment.
The section on alimony and division of
propertye starts off with the following
language: "A decree in an action under
6 Kan. Code Civ. Pro. 60-1410.
this article may include orders on the
following matters: . . . ." Certainly a
trial court will have the same power in
awarding alimony and dividing the
property on a decree of annulment as it
does on a decree of divorce. On its face
this section is also quite revolutionary.
It gives the court the power to award
alimony or transfer title to property from
one person to another even though they
have never been married. Actually
whether they have ever been married
depenIs, in theory, on whether the
grounds for the annulment render the
purported marriage void ab initio or
whether they render marriage only
voidable and consequently valid until
the date of the decree. 37 In effect, by al-
lowing alimony and a broad division of
property as part of a decree of annul-
ment, the legislature is saying that any
purported marriage is a valid marriage
until the date of decree. Therefore the
court can make the award.
3) When the Court enters a decree
granting separate maintenance.
Under the old statute, a client could
obtain a decree labeled by the statute
alimony only;38 which the court con-
strued this statute to mean that a divi-
sion of property could not be awarded.3 9
This rule is apparently changed by the
new code. Although the cause of action
under the new code is called "separate
maintenance," it is, in fact, if not in
theory, the equivalent of a* divorce
mensa et thoro. As in the case of a decree -
of annulment, the section on alimony and
division of property says "a decree ihi an
action under this -article .. " Surely this
includes a decree for separate mainte-
nance. Thus a client may obtain the same
economic decree whether the cause of
action is for a divorce, annulment or
separate maintenance. A suit for separate
maintenance differs from a suit for di-
aTSee 3 Nelson, Divorce and Annulment,
§§31.01 to 31.03 (2d. ed. 1945).
" Kan. G.S. 1949, 60-1516.
39 See Brayfield v. Brayfield, 175 Kan. 337,
264 P.2d 1064 (1953).
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vorce only in that the latter decree will
allow the parties to remarry while un-
der the former decree the spouses remain
technically married. The economic con-
sequences should not differ. A division of
property and alimony are both obtain-
able.
One problem may result, however,
when the court divides the property. The
court should state in its decree that -title
is held free and clear of the rights of the
other spouse which are granted by KAN.
G.S. 1949, 59-505.40 The Kansas Supreme
Court would probably hold that the
separate maintenance decree takes prec-
edence over the probate code,41 or it
could hold that the division of property
is an "other legal proceeding" which by
operation of 59-505 itself would allow the
spouse to sell the real property free and
clear. But it probably would be safer to
have the decree exclude the rights of the
other spouse. Even then a title attorney
might want the spouse not holding title
to sign the deed and it might be well to
have the court include an order that each
spouse is to sign the other's deeds.
42
4) When a divorce is granted on the
fault of both spouses.
Under the old code,43 as construed,44
the court could grant or deny a divorce
where both parties were at fault. If it
denied the divorce the statute was clear
as to the court's power to award alimony
and a division of property. But its power
to award alimony, and a division of
4 This section gives a surviving spouse a
one-half interest in all real property owned by
the other during the rfiarriage.
41 See Marshall v. Marshall, 159 Kan. 602,
156 P.2d 537 (1945) where the court went a
long way to protect a division of property
decree when it conflicted with the probate
code.
42Actually this problem existed when
the court divided the property after denying a
divorce pursuant to Kan. G.S. 1949, 60-1506.
Apparently the court has never been called
upon to pass on the problem.
43 Kan. G.S. 1949, 60-1506.
4Roberts v. Roberts, 103 Kan. 65, 173 Pac.
537 (1918). See also Biltgen v. Biltgen, 121
Kan. 716, 250 Pac. 265 (1926).
property was in doubt when it granted
the divorce. Apparently trial courts as-
sumed they could act under KAN. G.S.
1949, 60-1511. But that section limited
the granting of alimony to the situation
where only the husband was at fault and
the wife was innocent.
45
The new code clears up any doubt.
46
The court may make any of the economic
orders it could make when it granted a
divorce for the fault of one of the
spouses. Thus all of the problems con-
cerning a division of property and ali-
mony, discussed above, exist when the
divorce is granted for the fault of both.
5) When the divorce is denied due to
the equal fault of the parties.
Under the old code47 as construed
48
the court could divide the property of
the spouses when it denied the divorce
because of equal fault or for any other
reason, but was prohibited from granting
"alimony" or "separate maintenance."
The new code4- takes the approach that
if both parties prove fault the 'court
should be free to enter all of the eco-
nomic orders5" it could award when the
divorce was granted for the fault of one
spouse, even though it denied the divorce
itself. When both prove fault, it is a fair
assumption that the spouses will not live
together, so a maintenance order may be
needed and it is now authorized.
6) When a decree of divorce, separate
maintenance or annulment is denied
other than on the grounds of equal
fault.
As mentioned above, the old code"
allowed the court to divide the property
but not grant alimony when it denied the
divorce either because of equal fault or
'5 See Hopson, Economics of a Divorce, 11
Kan. L. Rev. 107, 122 (1962) for a discussion
of this problem.
" Kan. Code Civ. Pro., 60-1606.
17 Kan. G.S. 1949, 60-1506.
" Cf. Paul v. Paul, 183 Kan. 201, 326 P.2d
283 (1958).
4' Kan. Code Civ. Pro., 60-1606.
0, Except restoring to the wife her maiden
name!
" Kan. G.S. 1949, 60-1506.
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for any other reason.52 Under the new
code, this distinction is maintained when
the- divorce is denied "other than for
equal fault .... "s3 The theory seems to
be that if. the wife can not show fault, she,
should not receive future support. She
can have the property divided, but no
alimony. The concept of fault dies slowly.
This section also applies to suits for
separate maintenance and annulment
that are denied. Thus a wife, who sues
for separate maintenance or annulment,
but cannot prove grounds, may still ob-
tain a division of property and child
support, but will be denied alimony.
CHILD CUSTODY AND SUPPORT
A couple of new concepts in child
custody and support should be touched
on in closing. The new section on chil-
dren54 allows Kansas courts to decide
custody cases even though the child is
not domiciled in Kansas.55 This provision
overrules a long line of Kansas cases, 56
and is certainly welcome,
Two key changes were made in the
rules on child support. The court may
order property of the father or mother
"set apart" to the children for their sup-
port. The court may also order this prop-
erty "set apart" to step-children and
apparently can decree a monthly support
order in favor of step-children. 57 A new
husband not only marries the girl but
agrees to support her children.
CONCLUSION
The many other changes in the code
are too numerous to mention in this
short comment. A few ate important but
most are easily discovered by looking at
52 Presunably the normal reason would be
because the spouse could not prove his case.5
' Kan. Code'Civ. Pro., 60-1606.
' Kan. Code Civ. Pro., 60-1610(a).
" See Hopson, Divorce, supra note 2,. at 38
for a fuller discussion.
" See Comment, 10 Kan. L. Rev. 595 (1962)
for an excellent discussion of the now over-
ruled cases.
5 These new provisions are discussed in
Hopson, Divorce, supra note 2, at 39.
the new code. The -new code still needs
some improvement, but is better than the
divorce code it replaced. The attorney
should not have too many problems
operating under it.
Reapportionment
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whelming number of voters in the state,
and (t) was a plan which could be
changed at any time by the electors
through initiative anid referendum, not-
withstanding legislative inaction. The
high court, nevertheless,, declared the
new Colorado apportionment provisions
unconstitutional under the rule of Rey-
nolds v. Sims, and in so doing stated:
While a court sitting as a court of
equity might be justified in tempo-
rarily refraining from the issuance of
injunctive relief in an apportionment
case in order to allow for resort to an
available political remedy, such as
initiative and referendum, individual
constitutional rights cannot be de-
prived or denied judicial effectuation,
because of the existence of a non-
judicial remedy through which relief
against the alleged malapportion-
ment, which the individual voters
seek, might be achieved. An individ-
ual's constitutionally protected right
to cast an equally weighted vote can-
not be denied even by a vote of a
majority of a state's electorate, if the
apportionment scheme adopted by the
voters fails to measure up to the re-
quirements of the Equal Protection
Clause. Manifestly, the fact that an
apportionment plan is adopted in a
popular referendum is insufficient to
sustain its constitutionality or to in-
duce a court of equity to refuse to act.
A citizen's constitutional rights
can hardly be infringed simply because
a majority of the people choose to do
so. We hold that the fact that a chal-
lenged legislative apportionment plan
was approved by the electors is with-
out federal constitutional significance,
if the scheme adopted fails to satisfy
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